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Abstract:  
 
This Article submits that questions of institutional ability and legitimacy should play a 
more important role in the Court of Justice’s decision-making process. In effect, both 
the legal literature and the Court’s reasoning process tend to disregard such questions, 
thereby ignoring relevant comparative institutional choices which take place whether 
they are acknowledged or not. The deficiencies arising from the current approach will 
be exemplified by an analysis of developments in EU‘s free movement law on the 
requirements of cross-border elements, economic aim of free movement, and on the 
complementarity of these two requirements. In particular, it will be argued that the 
absence of properly reasoned institutional comparative analysis, when coupled with 
under-theorised normative foundations and the introduction of European Citizenship, 
has potentially explosive consequences for the scope of the EU’s market freedoms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent developments in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union’s (the “Court” or the “CJEU”) seem to have extended the substantive 
scope of the market freedoms1; this has occurred through a diminution of the 
number of situations deemed to be purely internal, an extension of the scope of 
activities deemed to have an economic nature and the use of the market 
freedoms to deal with situations beyond their traditional “telos”. It will be 
submitted that this results partially from an absence of dully theorised 
normative underpinnings for the case-law, but also from an absence of 
consideration of the institutional implications of adopting particular decisions. 
 
The main argument of this Article is not only that better theorisation by the 
Court of the normative underpinnings of the case-law is in order, but also that 
the Court and legal commentators should start taking into account institutional 
considerations alongside purely substantive ones. The insight underlying this is 
a very simple one: what a court should do is effectively limited by what it can 
do. In other words, evaluative and prescriptive assessments of courts and 
judges can only be fruitful if they are informed by a correct descriptive 
understanding of what they do, and what hidden comparative institutional 
choices are at play.2 The recent expansion in the scope of the market freedoms 
will be used to demonstrate how the institutional context matters to the 
development of law by courts; and to evidence the issues arising from the Court 
ignoring institutional consequences of its decision-making, particularly when 
the relevant normative foundations of the case-law are under-theorised to begin 
with. It will be submitted that a proper consideration of the different 
substantive and institutional normative foundations of the case-law, and of the 
ways in which they interact, leads to better descriptive frameworks and 
prescriptive approaches to the case-law.   
2. Contextualising Courts 
 
Courts are institutional bodies operating within specific institutional 
frameworks that constrain and shape their actions. Institutions, for our 
                                            
1 For the avoidance of doubt, these are the economic freedoms – free movement of goods, 
services, establishment, capital and workers.  
2 Arthur Dyevre, 'Making Sense of Judicial Lawmaking: A Theory of Theories of Adjudication' (EUI 
2008/09) <http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/bitstream/1814/8510/1/MWP_2008_09.pdf> accessed 10-
4-2010, 46. 
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purposes, include formal rules, such as constitutions, statutes, common law, 
regulations and even contracts; but they also include informal rules, which: 
 
Arising to coordinate repeated human interaction, […] are (1) extensions, 
elaborations and modifications of formal rules, (2) socially sanctioned 
norms of behaviour, and (3) internally enforced standards of conduct.3 
 
Institutional bodies – organizations - and institutional frameworks continuously 
interact and mutually constrain each other. In particular, all organizations have 
to operate under the existent institutional framework and thus have to navigate 
the options that such a framework provides. But they are also the major agents 
of institutional change: as organizations evolve and adapt, they alter 
institutional frameworks – the rules applying to them - as well. The path of 
institutional change is thus shaped by both the lock-in and path-dependency 
that comes from the symbiotic relationship between rules and organizations – 
with organizations being the result of an institutional framework which changes 
as a result of organizations adapting and trying to modify it - and the feedback 
process by which human beings perceive and react to the existent choice-set. In 
particular, incremental change comes from the perceptions of agents in 
political and economic organizations that they could do better by altering the 
existent institutional framework at the margin. On the other hand, this 
perception usually results from incomplete information processed through 
mental constructs, which leads to the institutional developments not being 
strictly those envisaged by those advancing them. 
 
This is particular the case with legal systems, namely those which are 
precedent-based. In these systems: 
  
past decisions become embedded in the structure of the law, which 
changes marginally as new cases arise involving new, or at least in terms of 
past cases unforeseen, issues; when decided these become, in turn, a part 
of the legal framework. The judicial decisions reflect the subjective 
processing of information in the context of the historical construction of 
the legal framework. (…) However we account for the judicial process, the 
institutional framework is continuously but incrementally modified by the 
purposive activities of organizations bringing cases before the courts.4 
 
In other words, history matters: the selection of a prior path determines current 
behaviour. Particularly in systems which follow precedent, but also in systems 
                                            
3Douglass C North, Institutions, institutional change and economic performance (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1990) 40. 
4 Ibid., 97. 
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which are not formally bound by stare decisis, legal rules gradually build upon 
one another over time, with the consequence that an earlier decision influences 
the later decisions of courts. This is related to the insight that organizations can 
maximise their situation by altering the institutional framework at the margin.5 
Litigants argue within the bounds of existent precedent and law; potential 
beneficiaries of new precedent have the incentive to push the law further, 
creating path-dependencies for both courts and subsequent litigants.6 Path 
dependence can be said to lead to three autonomous, if interconnected, 
phenomena7: the first is non-ergodicity, meaning that small early events have a 
large impact on the eventual outcome of the case law. The second effect is lock-
in, or inflexibility: once a court has taken a decision on a legal question, 
precedent and other informal rules lock in the legal rule. Nonetheless, it should 
also be pointed out that there are ways for judges to eschew precedent within 
the accepted scope of judicial reasoning, such as relying on different 
precedents, linguistic imprecisions and factual distinctions.8 In this particular, 
considerations of scope and ability might be serious determinants in a court’s 
decision to eschew past precedent.9 The third consequence is indeterminacy of 
outcome: a decision choosing between different solutions which were possible 
at an initial stage is adopted on the basis of imperfect information as to its 
consequences and ends up affecting the subsequent development of the case-
law. 
 
The CJEU is simultaneously empowered and constrained by rules both formal 
– the Treaties, specific procedural rules – and informal – the parameters of 
correct judicial discourse – which lead to it being path-dependent. On top of 
this, the Court is also constrained by its own limitations as to what it can 
effectively do: this relates both to their physical resources and their ability to 
                                            
5 North (n 3) 8. 
6 Oona A. Hathaway, 'Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change 
in a Common Law System' 86 Iowa L.Rev. 601, 627-630. On the role of litigants in shaping the 
development of the European economic freedoms, see Miguel Poiares Maduro, We, the Court - 
The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution - A Critical Reading of Article 
30 of the EC Treaty (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1998) 25ff. 
7 I here follow Hathaway (n 6) 630-634.  
8 Clayton P. Gillette, 'Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms' (1998) 78 B.U.L.Rev. 813, particularly 
824-5; Hathaway (n 6) 624-625. 
9 This is even sometimes made clear by the Court itself. In para. 12 of Joined Cases C-267/91 
and 268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] E.C.R. I-6097, it justified its changing of Dassonville by 
stating that: ‘In view of the increasing tendency of traders to invoke Article 30 of the Treaty as a 
means of challenging any rules whose effect is to limit their commercial freedom even where 
such rules are not aimed at products from other Member States, the Court considers it 
necessary to re-examine and clarify its case-law on this matter’. 
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investigate, understand and make the substantive social decisions that may 
come to them. It is the interaction of these limitations with the determinants of 
litigation that determines the institutional ability of the CJEU.10 For example, 
domestic courts are routinely prompted by savvy litigants to take account of and 
interpret free movement European law in otherwise mundane litigation. This 
occurs naturally, as these litigants attempt to use European law to their benefit. 
Considering the institutional ability of the adjudicative process is of the utmost 
importance when deciding those cases, because decisions about the scope of 
directly effective EU law provisions are comparative institutional assessments, 
in the sense that they allocate the competence to decide on the desirability of 
national legislation to national courts – and in last resort to the CJEU – instead 
of to national legislatures. What is more, the ease by means of which these 
litigants can refer to European law in situations where a potential gain might be 
obtained depends on the Court’s own case-law. 
 
Accordingly, the Court should not only be concerned with substantive 
questions, but also with the amount and complexity of litigation which reaches 
it, taking into account the limitations deriving from its physical capacity and its 
ability to correctly decide large amounts of cases; and these institutional 
constraints should in turn be compared with the other institutional options 
available. Avoiding these questions does not make them go away, but merely 
hides them, preventing the issues arising from them from being properly 
addressed and allowing them to effectively build up. This will now be 
demonstrated by reference to developments concerning the substantive scope 
of the market freedoms.  
3. The Scope of the Market Freedoms 
 
The market freedoms are traditionally considered to have an identity of aim: to 
contribute to the completion and functioning of the internal market through 
the elimination of obstacles to economic free movement between Member-
States and the creation of an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured.11 This is the 
primary normative underpinning of the Court’s case-law, but it still leaves a 
number of questions to be addressed. When Art. 3 (3) Treaty of the European 
                                            
10 Neil K. Komesar, Law's limits: the rule of law and the supply and demand of rights (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2001) 38; Mitchel Lasser, Judicial transformations: the rights 
revolution in the courts of Europe (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009) 204-205. 
11 See Art. 26 TFEU. See also Case 355/85 Driancourt v Cognet  [1986] E.C.R. 3231, and Case 
98/86 Mathot  [1987] E.C.R. 809. 
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Union (“TEU”) sets about the creation of an internal market which is supposed 
to contribute, simultaneously, to balanced economic growth and price stability, 
a highly competitive social market economy, a high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment, social justice, inter alia, it 
should be clear that, apart from the different meanings which can be attributed 
to expressions such as a “competitive social market economy”, the exclusive 
pursuit of a goal, such as economic growth, would to be to the detriment of 
other listed goals such as social justice or protection of the environment.12 
What is more, the different normative goals which fit into the internal market 
have evolved since the Union’s inception in 1957; of particular importance in 
this respect is the introduction and development of European Citizenship, 
which impact on the normative understanding of the market freedoms is still 
unclear but has been reflected in concerns about reverse discrimination and 
fundamental rights’ protection expressed in the legal literature and in 
Advocates General’s Opinions.13 
 
The following sections will show how tensions between these differing 
normative underpinnings have led to developments in the case-law concerning 
the scope of the market freedoms, and how institutional considerations are 
relevant to these and future developments. For these purposes, the Court’s 
case-law will be analytically divided into specific requirements which must be 
fulfilled in turn for a situation to fall within the scope of the market freedoms:14   
-  the existence of a cross-border element; 
-  the economic aim of the exercise of the free movement right; 
- the existence of a specific hindrance to the pursuit of cross-border 
movement with an economic aim. 
3.1 Cross-Border Elements 
 
This section will begin by describing the origins of the “purely internal 
situations” doctrine, which started from a debate in the field of private 
international law on whether the better way to distinguish between internal and 
                                            
12 K. Mortelmans, 'The common market, the internal market and the single market, what's in a 
market?' (1998) 35 CML Rev. 101, 118. This tension can be seen in the process and discussions 
started by the Commission’s Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions, on “A Single 
Market for 21st Century Europe”, COM(2007) 724. 
13 See in particular Advocate General Sharpston’s Opinion in Case C-34/09 Zambrano of 30 
September 2010, still unpublished. 
14 A similar structure can be found in Alina Tryfonidou, Reverse Discrimination in EC Law 
(Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn 2009) 10. 
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international situations was through a geographical or a juridical criterion. It 
will then be described how, having initially chosen the geographical criterion, 
the Court has recently relaxed its application and thereby eroded the 
application of this doctrine. Finally, an attempt will be made to understand this 
erosion.  
3.1.1 Origins of the Purely Internal Situations Doctrine  
 
From a purely normative perspective, it could be argued that obstacles to 
movement within Member-States could also be obstacles to the creation of an 
internal market. The Court could have legitimately decided that situations 
without a cross-border element fell within the scope of the market freedoms, 
depending on the conception of “internal market” adopted. Against this, the 
letter of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), with 
the exception of the provisions on free movement of workers, points towards 
only cross-border situations being subject to EU law15, and the pluralistic 
element of EU integration may be construed as leaving regulatory autonomy to 
the Member-States in situations not falling within the scope and purposes of 
EU law16, and as such requiring purely internal situations to fall outside the 
scope of the market freedoms. 
 
These different options were reflected in Saunders17 in the different solutions 
proposed by the Advocate General and the Court. Advocate General Warner 
held that: “The true question is not whether the case has any connection with another 
Member State, but whether and, if so, to what extent Community law confers rights on 
a person.” From this perspective, what would matter was not whether the 
factual situation was circumscribed to a single Member-State but whether the 
national measure infringed the substance of rights conferred by the free 
movement provisions. The Court, however, decided otherwise, holding that the 
free movement of workers did not have the goal of restricting the power of 
Member-States to lay down rules in purely internal situations. The different 
                                            
15 See, for goods, Art. 28, 30, 34 and 35 TFEU, which all include prohibitions between Member-
States on custom duties on imports and exports and all charges having equivalent effect; on 
establishment and services, which prohibit restrictions on such freedoms on nationals of a 
Member-State in the territory of another Member-State, see Art. 49 and 56 TFEU; and on capital, 
Art. 63 TFEU prohibits all restrictions on its free movement between Member-States (and also 
third-countries). Naturally, at the time the relevant provisions were part of the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty).  
16 Tryfonidou (n 14) 9. 
17  Case 175/78 Saunders  [1979] E.C.R. 1129, following a lead from Case 115/78 Knoors  [1979] 
E.C.R. 399. 
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approaches identified above are reminiscent of two criteria used in private 
international law to distinguish between international and internal situations: a 
“geographical” criterion, focusing on where the facts of the case take place, and 
a “juridical” one, which looks into whether more than one legal system is 
connected to the case.18 The procedural implications of this were neatly 
encapsulated by Advocate General Geelhoed: 
 
[…] the Treaty provisions concerning free movement (of persons and goods) 
do not apply to activities all of the relevant aspects of which are confined to 
one Member-State. […] The main question is this: is it the facts in the main 
proceedings that determine whether the Court must answer the questions 
referred to it for a preliminary ruling, or is it the nature and substance of 
the national measure? If it is the facts in the main proceedings that are 
decisive, the Court clearly will not answer the question where the main 
proceedings have no cross-border elements. […] If it is the substance of the 
national measure that is decisive, the Court should consider how far the 
national legislation may have an external effect. Only if there is no - 
potential - external effect should the Court refrain from answering the 
question referred to it.19 
 
Following Saunders, the Court adopted a unitary approach to all the freedoms, 
favouring the geographical approach. The canonical formulations for this were 
that the free movement provisions do not apply to activities which have no 
factor linking them with any of the situations governed by EU law and/or that 
are confined in all aspects within a single Member-State.20  
3.1.2 Relaxing the Geographical Requirement 
 
Some recent cases have arguably moved away from this unitary approach, 
particularly in what concerns the free movement of products (goods and 
                                            
18 Hans Ulrich Jessurun d'Oliveira, 'Is Reverse Discrimination Still Permissible under the 
Single European Act?' in Forty Years on: The Evolution of Postwar Private International Law in 
Europe (Kluwer, Dewenter 1990) 73-74. 
19 Opinion in Joined Cases C-515/99, C-519/99 to C-524/99 and C-526/99 to C-540/99 Reisch  
[2002] E.C.R. I-2157, para. 79-82. 
20 d'Oliveira, 73-74, Tryfonidou, 30-31. See for goods Mathot, Case C-60/91 Morais  [1992] E.C.R. 
I-2085; for establishment, Case C-198/89 Tourist Guides Greece  [1991] E.C.R. I-00727, para. 9, 
Joined Cases C-64/96 and C-65/96 Uecker and Jacquet  [1997] E.C.R. I-3171; for services, Case 
20/87 Gauchard  [1987] E.C.R. 4879, Joined Cases C-54/88, C-91/88 and C-14/89 Nino  [1990] 
E.C.R. I-3537, Case C-152/94 Buynder  [1995] E.C.R. I-3981; for capital, Case C-513/03 van 
Hilten-van der Heijden  [2006] E.C.R. I-10653. 
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services).  In Lancry21 the Court held that the prohibition of custom duties set 
forth in Article 28 TFEU (ex-Art 23 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (“TEC”)) does not apply only to duties imposed on goods that have 
moved from one State to another, but also to customs duties imposed on goods 
crossing the internal frontiers of a Member-State, at least inasmuch as they 
could also apply to imported goods – which distinction from national goods, in 
light of the prohibition of border controls and the conclusion of the internal 
market, was seen to be practically impossible.22 This was further developed in 
Jersey Produce23, where the Court held that even though an internal customs 
duty applied only to the export of potatoes from Jersey to the United Kingdom: 
 
that does not rule out the possibility that such potatoes, once within the 
United Kingdom, might then be re-exported to other Member-States, with 
the result that the contribution in question may be levied on goods which, 
after having passed through the United Kingdom in transit, are in fact 
exported to other Member-States.24 
 
Hence, the principle appears to be that whenever it is impossible to identify 
whether potential imports or exports are to be affected by a custom duty, such 
a duty will infringe Union law, even where it applies to products which are in a 
purely internal situation.25 This approach appears to have been transposed into 
Art. 34 TFEU (ex-Art 28 TEC) by Pistre.26 The facts of the case concerned an 
appeal brought by French nationals for selling goods produced in France 
under the description “montagne”. The use of this description was allowed 
only in relation to products prepared in French territory after the producer 
had obtained an authorisation from the French authorities. In the case at hand, 
all the relevant legislation was complied with, but no authorisation had been 
obtained. Choosing not to look into the specific facts of the case, the Court 
held that: 
 
Article 30 cannot be considered inapplicable simply because all the facts of 
the specific case before the national court are confined to a single Member-
                                            
21 Joined Cases C-363/93, C-407/93, C-408/93, C-409/93, C-410/93 and C-411/93 Lancry  [1994] 
E.C.R. I-3957. Confirmed  in Case C-72/03 Carbonati Apuani  [2004] E.C.R. I-8027. 
22 Peter Oliver and Wulf-Henning Roth, 'The Internal Market and the Four Freedoms' (2004) 41 
CMLR 407, 431, Cyril Ritter, 'Purely Internal Situations, Reverse Discrimination, Guimont, 
Dzodzi and Article 234' (2006) 31 E.L.Rev. 690, 706. 
23 Case C-293/02 Jersey Produce  [2005] E.C.R. I-9543 
24 Ibid., para. 65. 
25 Tryfonidou (n 14) 75. 
26 Joined Cases C-321/94 to C-324/94 Pistre [1997] E.C.R I-2343. 
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State. In such a situation, the application of the national measure may also 
have effects on the free movement of goods between Member-States, in particular 
when the measure in question facilitates the marketing of goods of 
domestic origin to the detriment of imported goods. In such circumstances, 
the application of the measure, even if restricted to domestic producers, in 
itself creates and maintains a difference of treatment between those two 
categories of goods, hindering, at least potentially, intra-Community 
trade.27 [emphasis added] 
 
In itself, this statement could be read as applying the juridical approach, 
looking not into the facts of the case but into the substance of the national 
measure and its potential external effects.28 On the other hand, the Court went 
on to note that since it was “accepted that the domestic legislation in question could 
be applied to products imported from other Member-States, it follows, first, that it 
constitutes an obstacle to intra-Community trade”, which seems to imply that the 
free movement of goods merely protects imported goods and that the 
geographic criterion still stood.  
 
This was clarified in Guimont29, where the Court distinguished Pistre as applying 
the juridical approach only to discriminatory rules, and stated that on what 
concerns indistinctly applicable rules: “it is clear from the Court's case-law that 
such a rule falls under Article 30 of the Treaty only in so far as it applies to situations 
that are linked to the importation of goods in intra-Community trade”. However, the 
Court went on to state that a preliminary reference request from a national 
court will only be refused if it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Union 
law sought bears no relation to the actual nature of the case or to the subject-
matter of the main action, and since it was possible that a reply might be useful 
if national law were to require that the rights which a foreign producer would 
derive from Community law must also be enjoyed by national producers – 
thereby preventing reverse discrimination - , the Court would still look at the 
rule.30 Similarly, in PreussenElecktra the Court essentially dismissed out-of-hand 
any argument that a situation had no cross-border element by stating that it was 
for the referring court to determine whether the question was relevant and 
stating that “it is not obvious that the interpretation sought bears no relation to the 
actual facts of the main action or its purpose.”31 This so-called Guimont case-law has 
                                            
27 Ibid., paras 44-45. 
28 See, in this sense, Tryfonidou (n 14) 71. 
29 Case C-448/98 Guimont  [2000] E.C.R. I-10663. 
30 Ibid., paras 20-23. 
31 Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra  [2001] E.C.R. I-2099, para. 52. 
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been progressively adopted under capital32, services,33 establishment34, and it 
appears that it might also be applicable for workers35. Thus, the Court seems to 
be moving away from its traditional geographical requirements of cross-border 
elements, and to be now willing to review measures applying to purely internal 
situations as long as the national referring courts consider the question to be 
relevant.   
 
A parallel development away from the canonical understanding of the purely 
internal situations doctrine is also taking place through the extension of the 
geographical criterion itself, particularly in the field of free movement of 
persons. It is settled law that a situation will have a link with free movement 
law if it involves a potential, but not a merely hypothetical, exercise of a market 
freedom. 36 The distinction between what is a hypothetical or potential exercise 
of a market freedom is not exactly clear, however, and the Court has taken 
advantage of this to expand the scope of the free movement of persons by 
increasing the number of situations deemed to have potential links with EU 
law.37 Even as the Court has reiterated that the free provision of services does 
not apply to purely hypothetical situations, the Court recently set forth that 
there is no need to prove the existence of a previously determined recipient as 
long as the recipient is determinable38: the existence of either virtual or merely 
possible future recipients suffices.39  In effect, the case-law no longer insists on 
a specific exercise of inter-State movement, as long as a potential effect on the 
                                            
32 Reisch (n 19). 
33 Case C-6/01 Anomar [2003] E.C.R. I-8261. See Stefan Enchelmaier, 'Always at your service 
(within limits)' (2011) 36 E.L.Rev. 615, 617. 
34  Case C-250/03 Mauri [2005] E.C.R. I-1267. 
35 See Advocate General Léger’s Opinion in Case C-152/03 Ritter-Coulais [2006] E.C.R. I-1711, 
footnote 47. 
36 See for the free movement of workers Case 180/83 Moser [1984] E.C.R. 2539, para. 18; Case C-
41/90 Höfner and Elser [1991] E.C.R. I-1979, para. 39. On the application of this principle to all 
free movement of persons provisions, see Case C-299/95 Kremzow [1997] E.C.R. I-2629. 
37 Niamh Nic Shuibhne, ‘Free Movement of persons and the wholly internal rule: time to move 
on?’ (2002) 39 CML Rev. 731, 736. 
38 Vassilis Hatzopoulos, 'Recent Developments of the Case Law of the ECJ in the Field of 
Services' (2000) 37 CML Rev. 43, 58. See Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments [1995] E.C.R. I-1141, 
Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Deliège [2000] E.C.R. I-2549, Case C-405/98 Gourmet 
International  E.C.R. I-1795, Case C-355/00 Freskot [2003] E.C.R. I-5263.  
39Alpine, Case C-36/02 Omega  [2004] E.C.R. I-9609, Case C-215/03 Oulane [2005] E.C.R. I-01215. 
See Vassilis Hatzopoulos and Thien Uyen Do, 'The Case Law of the ECJ concerning the Free 
Provision of Services: 2000-2005' (2006) 43 CML Rev. 923, 926. 
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intra-State provision of services can be found.40 Like in Pistre, even though all 
the facts of the case may be located within a Member-State, a situation might 
still fall within the scope of the market freedoms.41  
3.1.3 Understanding the Erosion of the Purely Internal Doctrine 
 
Taken together, all these developments point towards the Court extending the 
kind and type of cases it is willing to review. The distinction between juridical 
and geographical approaches, which heuristic value had always hinged on the 
Court tacitly endorsing it, lost much of its explanatory power in this scenario. 
A question about the degree of (geographical) cross-border elements required 
may, through the manipulation of whether a situation is potentially or 
hypothetically concerned with cross-border movement, become a question on 
whether a situation has a sufficient connection with the free movement 
provision; and similarly, a question about whether the situation falls within the 
scope of a freedom can easily be framed in geographical terms. At the same 
time, the Guimont doctrine allows the Court to review national measures even 
when it accepts that a situation is purely internal.  
 
What justifies this erosion of the purely internal doctrine? It should be noted 
that, for all the references to geographical and juridical criteria in the 
literature, the Court never did provide a coherent normative theory for this 
doctrine to begin with. The original concern seemed to be with the 
maintenance of an area of Member-State autonomy, but this might have been 
overrun by new normative concerns: prior to the developments described 
above, legal commentators started to submit arguments against reverse 
discrimination42 on the basis of the adoption and development of European 
Citizenship, and the protection of fundamental rights.43 A similar argument can 
be seen in the Court’s justification of its Guimont case-law, which is that a 
decision may still be useful if: 
 
national law were to require, in proceedings such as those in this case, that 
a national producer must be allowed to enjoy the same rights as those 
                                            
40 Tryfonidou (n 14) 85; Enchelmaier (n 33) 618. 
41 Compare Case C-108/98 RI.SAN. [1999] E.C.R. I-5219 and Case C-410/04 ANAV [2006] E.C.R. 
I-3303. 
42 These are situations where those not encompassed by the free movement provisions – namely 
those involved in purely internal situations - are left worse-off than those who do fall within 
their scope. 
43 Nic Shuibhne, 731, Alina Tryfonidou, 'Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations: 
An Incongruity in a Citizen's Europe' (2008) 35 LIEI 43. 
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which a producer of another Member-State would derive from Community 
law in the same situation.44 
 
Nonetheless, the Court never properly discussed how to balance the relevant 
normative concerns at stake. Academic contributions to the subject made their 
own normative contributions, but tend to not consider the institutional 
realities of judicial decision-making by the CJEU, focusing instead on the 
undesirable and unjust results of reverse discrimination. But taking into 
account these institutional considerations allows us to bring to the forefront an 
important distinction: the purely internal doctrine comports both procedural 
and substantial implications.  
 
From a procedural standpoint, the purely internal rule is a gatekeeper to the 
preliminary reference mechanism: if the case under consideration by the 
national court concerned a purely internal situation, the Court would not 
pursue any assessment of the relevant measures. Nonetheless, this refusal on 
the part of the Court to pursue assessments under the preliminary reference 
mechanism had no implication on the substantive status of a measure under 
EU law: in effect, that measure could still be subject to review under, say, an 
infringement procedure brought by the Commission against a Member-State or 
by a litigant whose situation had a cross-border element. From a substantive 
perspective, the implications of this doctrine are that the free movement rules 
have no effect on situations the facts and effects of which are confined within a 
single Member-State, even if such a measure would fall within their scope on 
what concerns situations with a cross-border element.45 What this means, in 
turn, is that the same national measure is sometimes legal, sometimes illegal, 
depending on the underlying factual situation in which it is applied. The 
Member-State is merely required not to apply the relevant measure in cross-
border situations, while it is allowed to apply it in purely internal situations.46  
 
This distinction is important to understand the developments in the case-law. 
Under the Guimont case-law the Court does not seem to control whether 
national law prevents reverse discrimination or not before assessing national 
                                            
44 Guimont (n 29) para. 23. 
45 See on goods, Joined Cases 314/81 to 316/81 and 83/82 Waterkeyn [1982] E.C.R. 4337; Case 
286/81 Oosthoek's [1982] E.C.R. 4575; on services, see Case 52/79 Debauve [1980] E.C.R. 833, 
Höfner and Elser (n 36); on workers, see Case C-332/90 Steen [1992] E.C.R. I-341, Case C-379/92 
Peralta [1994] E.C.R. I-3453, Case C-212/06 Government of Communauté française and 
Gouvernement wallon [2008] E.C.R. I-1683; on establishment, see Nino (n 20). There is still no 
case-law on capital that I’m aware of. 
46 This is particularly clear in Case 407/85 Drei Glocken [1988] E.C.R. 4233. See also Ritter (n 22) 
691. It should be noted that it is this substantial effect which leads to reverse discrimination.  
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measures; it doesn't even require the national court to actually show that its 
national law prohibits reverse discrimination. Hence the risk of delivering 
purely theoretical rulings is real.47 The implications and reasoning of the 
Guimont case-law are, from a procedural perspective, akin to the Court’s case-
law on the extent of its jurisdiction in preliminary reference cases. The Court 
was initially very liberal in this area, holding that the facts were a matter for 
national courts, and that the Court was not empowered to investigate the facts 
of the case or question the grounds or purpose of the request for 
interpretation.48 Nonetheless, the Court eventually asserted control over its 
docket in the Foglia49 decisions, becoming the ultimate decider of its own 
jurisdiction. In particular, the Court held that a genuine dispute was required 
and that the Court had no jurisdiction to deliver “advisory opinions on general 
or hypothetical questions”. Ever since, the Court has refused to answer 
hypothetical questions, which might be justified as preventing a waste of 
judicial resources.50 The Guimont approach to the purely internal doctrine is a 
limited return to the original, pre-Foglia, case-law on the Court’s jurisdiction in 
preliminary reference cases: it effectively opens the door to test-cases in 
situations without any direct link with EU law which, if successful, will put the 
Member-States in the “shadow of the law” and under pressure to amend 
national rules; it increases the pool of litigants and, potentially, the workload of 
the Court, and thereby risks increasing the level of control the Court exercises 
on national regulatory autonomy as well. Nonetheless, it does not per se lead to 
a substantive extension of the scope of the freedoms.  
 
Substantively, the Court has extended the scope of the market freedoms not 
only explicitly in what concerns custom duties and discriminatory 
infringements to the free movement of goods, but implicitly through an 
increase in the number of situations which are held to have a potential link 
with EU law. The main issue is that there is a very thin line between merely 
potential situations and test cases, as a measure applicable to an internal 
                                            
47 See Advocate General Tizzano’s Opinion in Anomar (n 33) para. 23. Critical of this, Ritter (n 
22) 700. 
48 See, for example, Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL  [1964] E.C.R. 585, Case 35/76 Simmenthal  [1976] 
E.C.R. 1871. 
49 Case 104/79. Foglia I  [1980] E.C.R. 745, Case 244/80 Foglia II  [1981] E.C.R. 3045. 
50 Please note that this is not the only reason for the Court to refuse to pass judgement: this may 
also occur when the questions have no relation to the facts or subject-matter of the main action 
- Case C-18/93 Corsica Ferries Italia  [1994] E.C.R. I-1783 - when the questions are not 
articulated clearly enough for the Court to give any meaningful response - Case C-318/00 
Bacardi-Martini  [2003] E.C.R. I-905 – and when the facts are insufficiently clear for the Court to 
be able to apply the relevant legal rules - Case C-157/92 Banchero  [1993] E.C.R. I-1085. 
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situation can hypothetically also apply to future cross-border situations.51 This 
is valid not only for services, where this line of cases had its genesis, but also 
for other freedoms: companies might potentially want to expand to another 
country, workers seek jobs abroad, and goods may potentially compete in 
another market. After all, the Dassonville formula for goods relates to “actual and 
potential” effects. The problem this raises it that, as has been said, in an internal 
market the existence of a “potential” intra-Community element is inherent.52 
Particularly in what concerns services this is worrying, as due to the breadth of 
subjects falling under it, and the application to both active and passive actors, 
few (temporary) migrants are excluded from its protection.53   
 
This could be controlled, or at least justified, if there was a clear normative 
basis for these developments, but this seems to be absent. The Court has 
avoided a careful consideration of what the relevant balance between protecting 
State autonomy and preventing reverse discrimination might be. Reverse 
discrimination touches on how the limitations on EU law deriving from 
subsidiarity, the EU’s  limited competences and the maintenance of an area of 
State autonomy is to relate to the expansionary pull of European citizenship, 
but this is not addressed in the case-law. It is true that courts will usually 
decide cases on the basis of the particulars facts of the case without needing to 
engage with the large-scale societal questions underlying it: they may enlist 
silence as a device for producing convergence despite disagreement and 
uncertainty by adopting an incompletely theorised outcome. This mechanism is 
an important source of social stability by allowing the participants to be clear 
on a result without agreeing on a more general theory or value that accounts for 
it, and is well-suited to a pluralist society.54 But even without having the Court 
engage in large-scale theorising, better low-level theorisation seems to be in 
order. The absence of debate or theorisation on these normative issues leads to 
a lack of coherence in the development of the case-law on purely internal 
situations and to the potential extension of the case-law on services and custom 
duties to include virtually any situation. Simultaneously, the Court also seems 
to ignore the institutional implications of its decisions, with the result that both 
procedural and substantive approaches relax the requirements for submitting 
national measures to review by the Court, without any consideration for the 
                                            
51 On all of the above, see P. P. Craig and G. De Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (4th 
edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 482-493. 
52 Eleanor Spaventa, Free Movement of Persons in the European Union (Kluwer Law International, 
2007) 153. 
53 Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU (Second edn, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2007) 335. 
54 Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (OUP, Oxford 1996) 5, 44. 
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risks in opening the floodgates of litigation or the institutional allocation of 
competences between the EU and the Member-States. Even when there is 
theorisation, as in the legal literature, it ignores the institutional considerations 
that permeate the normative debate. Normative claims contain implicit 
assumptions as to which entity is best placed to further them – for example, 
normative claims that the purely internal doctrine should be eliminated 
implicitly call for an expansion of EU powers, and consider that the interests of 
nationals of a Member-State are, in the case of reverse discrimination, better 
protected by the CJEU than by the Member-States themselves.  
 
Taking into account the interaction of “substantive” and “institutional” 
concerns has both normative and descriptive power. This can be demonstrated 
by reference to the different strands in the case-law – one procedural, the other 
substantive. Each strand has different institutional consequences relevant to 
the debate on more “substantive” normative questions: while the extension of 
the material scope of the market freedoms leads to the Court dealing with 
reverse discrimination itself, the Guimont case-law leaves this question for 
Member-States’ courts and governments. The Court effectively uses the purely 
internal situation strategically as a tool for institutional choice, deciding which 
cases it wants to deal with and those it delegates to national courts or 
legislatures. Both can be seen as means of dealing with reverse discrimination, 
but the existence of these different institutional options changes the 
configuration of the relevant “substantive” normative debate itself, for example 
on questions of how to better protect and balance State autonomy against other 
normative concerns. “Substantive” and “institutional” normative considerations 
are, in this context, autonomous but inseparable because closely intertwined. 
3.2 The Economic Aim of Cross-Border Movement 
 
The market freedoms are instrumental to the completion and functioning of the 
internal market through the elimination of obstacles to economic free 
movement. As such, they have an economic aim which is reflected in their 
scope.55 This characterisation is under-theorised, though, as there are different 
concepts of economic activity. While some conceptualizations focus strictly on 
the production of goods and services, others add to this their distribution and 
consumption. Welfare definitions of economic activity, on the other hand, 
focus on the production and distribution of goods and services which are 
                                            
55 It should be noted that for freedoms implying the free movement of persons the situation 
must also fall within the scope of the freedoms ratione personae, i.e. the persons moving must be 
nationals –or be related to nationals – of a Member-State. 
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provided against measurable amounts of money or other material requirements 
of well-being.56  
 
These differing conceptualizations are reflected in EU law, where both the 
Court and the Commission seem to admit the existence of different concepts of 
economic activity depending on the relevant areas of law.57 EU competition law 
can only be applied to undertakings, which, according to the case-law, include 
every entity engaged in economic activity, regardless of its legal status.58 An 
activity is deemed to be economic when there is the potential for the provision 
of goods or services and to make a profit under market conditions, unless that 
activity is deemed to be in the public interest or pursued in the exercise of 
official authority. In other words, the question seems to be whether a for-profit 
entity could respond to market demand.59 However, only the offering of 
products seems to be relevant; demand is not deemed to be an economic 
activity, at least in what concerns the purchase of goods on the market for use 
in the provision of State services.60  
 
The concept of economic activity for the purpose of the market freedoms is 
somewhat different: it focuses on both the provision and demand of goods or 
services against some kind of remuneration.61 Goods are generally accepted to 
be material objects which can be valued in money and either form the subject 
                                            
56 Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics: An Introductory Volume (8th edn, Macmillan, London 
1949); A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (4th edn, Macmillan, London 1962). 
57 See Case C-519/04 P Meca-Medina [2006] E.C.R. I-6991, para. 33. See also Advocate General 
Maduro’s Opinion in Case C-205/03 P FENIN [2006] E.C.R. I-6295, para. 51; and Advocate 
General Kokott’s Opinion in Case C-284/04 T-Mobile Austria E.C.R. I-05189, para. 61. Similarly, 
see Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Accompanying the Communication 
on ‘A single market for 21st century Europe’ Services of general interest, including social services of 
general interest: a new European commitment (COM 2007 725 Final p 5). 
58 Höfner and Elser (n 36) para. 21.  
59 See Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 Pavlov [2000] E.C.R. I-6451, para. 75, Case C-364/92 
Eurocontrol [1994] E.C.R. I-0043, Meca-Medina (n 57) para. 41 and Advocate General Maduro 
Opinion in FENIN (n 57) para. 13-14. See also N Dunne, 'Knowing When To See It: State 
Activities, Economic Activities, and the Concept of Undertaking' (2010) 16 Columbia Journal of 
European Law 427, 436. 
60 Marck Furse, Competition Law (OUP, Oxford 2008), 22. See FENIN (n 57). 
61 Okeoghene Odudu, 'Economic Activity as a Limit to Community Law' in O. Odudu (ed) The 
Outer Limits of European Union Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2009) 230-231. It should be 
noticed that remuneration is not a necessary element in competition law: see Case T-155/04 
Selex [2006] E.C.R. II-4797, para. 77. 
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of, or move across frontiers for the purposes of, commercial transactions.62 
Establishment applies to both physical and legal persons who are engaged in 
self-employed activities, meaning the actual pursuit of an economic activity 
with the purpose of obtaining a profit63; accordingly, the right of establishment 
seems not to apply to non-profits.64 Free movement of capital follows the 
content of Article 1 of Directive 88/361 and the nomenclature of capital 
movements annexed thereto, which are all deemed to concern economic 
activities. 65 The situation for workers is slightly more nuanced, if very much 
settled law. As it stands, this freedom encompasses anyone who, for a certain period 
of time, performs services for and under the direction of another person in 
return for which he receives remuneration66, regardless of the level of 
productivity or the origin of the funds from which the remuneration is paid.67  
 
This means that activities which are not remunerated but have profit-making 
potential fall within the scope of competition law but not free movement law, 
and vice-versa. For example, activities which are deemed to be in the public 
interest - such as the maintenance of air navigation safety and the protection of 
the environment68 -, or which operate under the principle of solidarity – such as 
the payment of benefits out of social security schemes69 - do not fall within the 
scope of competition law, as they are deemed not to be profit-making activities, 
even though they might fall within the scope of the free movement provisions 
inasmuch as there is remuneration. From an opposite perspective, an activity 
might be economic independently of the way in which it is financed, meaning 
that activities which are financed by the State without any remuneration – such 
                                            
62 Jukka Snell, Goods and services in EC law: a study of the relationship between the freedoms (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2002) 4-5. See Case 7/68 Commission v Italy [1968] E.C.R. 423 and Case 
C-2/90 Walloon Waste [1992] ECR I-4431. 
63 Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] E.C.R. I-4165, para. 25, Directive 2006/123/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market, Art. 4 
(5). 
64 Advocate General Fenelly’s Opinion in Case C-70/95 Sodemare [1997] E.C.R. I-3395, para. 21. 
65 Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the 
Treaty. 
66 Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum  [1986] E.C.R. 2121, para. 16-17; Case 344/87 Bettray [1989] E.C.R. I-
1621, para. 12; Case C-337/97 Meeusen  [1999] E.C.R. I-3289. 
67 Bettray (n 66) para. 15. 
68 Advocate General Maduro’s Opinion in FENIN (n 57) para. 15.  
69 See Pistre (n 26). 
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as employment procurement by State agencies - might fall within the scope of 
competition law but not the free movement provisions.70 
 
Determining whether an activity is economic does not pose significant 
problems on most occasions, but when it is not clear whether an activity is 
economic or not, the lack of a proper normative underpinning of the case-law 
comes to the fore. For example, the concept of remuneration for services was 
traditionally held to be consideration for a service to be normally agreed upon 
between providers and recipients of services.71 Even though it was from early 
on accepted that remuneration need not be paid by the service recipients 
themselves,72 the concept of remuneration has been recently extended beyond 
its former limits to cover payments that are only indirectly related to the service 
provided - in the sense that the remuneration does not need to be agreed 
between the parties, it needs not be provided by the service recipient and it can 
even be subject to subsequent reimbursement by a third party.73 In applying 
this new concept of remuneration, the Court sometimes acts incoherently. For 
example, the provision of services in the area of public education is held not to 
be economic for the purposes of the Treaty because it is considered that the 
State is not seeking to engage in gainful activity and the system in question is, 
as a general rule, funded from the public purse and not by pupils or their 
parents.74 However, this reasoning is not applicable to the public provision of 
hospital health services in the scheme of insurance services providing benefits 
in-kind, even though similar arguments would seem to hold.75  These 
inconsistencies cannot be explained away in the basis of normative arguments 
about what constitutes economic activity – even though they are evidence of an 
absence of due consideration of the relevant normative foundations. 
 
A fuller picture of the case-law emerges once, in addition to taking into account 
normative indeterminacy, one considers the institutional consequences of an 
                                            
70 Höfner and Elser (n 36) paras 21-22. 
71 Case 263/86 Humbel [1988] E.C.R. 5365, para. 17; Freskot (n 38) para. 55. 
72 Case 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders [1988] E.C.R. 2085 
73 Pedro Cabral, 'The internal market and the right to cross border medical care' (2004) 19 
E.L.Rev. 673, 677; Hatzopoulos and Do (n 39) 946-947; Lorna Woods, Free Movement of Goods 
and Services within the European Community (Ashgate, Aldershot 2004) 168-174. 
74 Humbel and Case C-109/92 Wirth [1993] E.C.R. I-6447. 
75 Case C-157/99 Smits & Peerbooms [2001] E.C.R. I-5473 and Case C-368/98 Vanbraekel [2001] 
E.C.R. I-5363. In both cases the Advocate Generals argued the situation did not fall within the 
freedom’s scope. Interestingly, situations similar to Smits & Peerboms, in that it concerns health 
services provided free of charge by hospitals, were held not to be economic for competition law 
purposes: see FENIN (n 57).  
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activity being deemed economic or not. The concept of “economic activity” 
serves as a limit to EU law, preserving for Member States an area of autonomy 
over non-economic areas.76 But economic activity does not work merely as a 
device for the allocation of competences between the EU and the Member-
States: it also operates as a device to determine whether the Court should be 
able to overrule Member-State choices or whether such overruling should only 
occur if the EU political process so decides. Nonetheless, institutional concerns 
are not explicitly considered in the case-law, and tend to be ignored by legal 
commentators. But they are very relevant in this context, and are implicit in 
claims that the flexible use of the concept of remuneration has led to arguments 
that the Court uses it pragmatically to get rid of cases it does not want to decide 
or to decide cases it would not have competence to do so beforehand.77  
 
In the absence of a careful consideration of the relevant normative and 
institutional underpinnings, decisions by the Court on whether an activity is 
economic or not constitute unprincipled - or at least unjustified – comparative 
institutional choices. This exemplifies how institutional considerations are 
necessary, because implicit, in any serious debate about what constitutes, or 
should constitute, an economic activity for the purposes of EU free movement 
law.  
3.3 Hindrances to cross-border movement with an economic aim 
 
The simple exercise of the right of free movement within the Community is 
not in itself sufficient to bring a particular set of circumstances within the 
scope of Community Law; there must be some connecting factor between 
the exercise of the right of free movement and the right relied on by the 
individual.78 
 
This succinct formulation of the orthodox case-law requires that for a 
restriction to a free movement right to be found there must be a link between 
the economic aim and the cross-border element.79 The scope of the market 
                                            
76 Odudu (n 61) 226. Subject, naturally, to EU competences over specific non-economic areas. 
77 See also the criticism in Spaventa (n 52) 54-58, Vassilis Hatzopoulos, 'Killing National Health 
and Insurance Systems but Healing Patients? The European Market for Healthcare Services 
after the Judgements of the ECJ in Vanbraekel and Peerbooms' (2002) 39 CML Rev. 683, 693-4. 
78 Case C-370/90 Singh [1992] E.C.R. I-4265, para. 5 of Advocate General Tesauro’s Opinion. 
79 This link was an ingrained and generally accepted element of the concept of restriction to the 
free movement provisions, applying independently of the much more contentious issue of 
whether restrictions should concern only discriminatory or also indistinctly applicable 
measures, an issue which will not be addressed here. 
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freedoms requires that the rights granted by the Treaty be exercised in a cross-
border situation for an economic purpose. Nonetheless, the Court seems to be 
doing its utmost to get as far away as possible from this principle without 
expressly reneging it, at least in what concerns the free movement of 
individuals.  
 
Arguably the origins of this case-law can be found in Cowan,80 a case 
concerning a national measure making the award of State compensation for 
harm caused in France to the victim of an assault resulting in physical injury 
subject to the condition that the victim holds a residence permit or is a national 
of a country which has entered into a reciprocal agreement with France. As the 
French State argued, this requirement posed no obstacle to economic free 
movement. Nonetheless, the Court considered this rule to be contrary to the 
free provision of services. It held that there was a sufficient cross-border 
element because the situation concerned tourists, i.e., service recipients, who 
had travelled across State borders. One way to make sense of this case would 
be to consider that it did not concern market freedoms at all, but instead 
granted an autonomous status to the prohibition of discrimination on grounds 
of nationality. This view could be reinforced by reference to Bickel and Franz81, 
a case concerning a refusal to grant to German-speaking foreigners in Italy a 
right to use their own language in interactions with the judicial and 
administrative authorities based in the Bolzano province when such a right was 
granted to German-speaking Italians. The Court decided that such a refusal was 
prohibited by the general prohibition of discrimination arising from Art. 18 
TFEU (ex-Art 12 TEC).82 However, a number of other cases where the link 
between economic aim and cross-border elements was dubious cannot be 
explained by reference to the autonomy and blanket application of a general 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality.83 The paradigmatic 
example of this is Carpenter84. Mr Carpenter was a British national who married 
in the UK a Philippines’ national who had overstayed her allowed leave. The 
                                            
80 Case 186/87 Cowan [1989] E.C.R. 195 
81 Case C-274/96 Bickel and Franz [1998] E.C.R. I-7637. 
82 The question here is whether there was a link with EU law to start with. While the Court 
ignored the issue, Advocate General Jacobs in his Opinion tried to establish such a link by 
reference to European Citizenship. 
83 See Singh and Case C-291/05 Eind [2007] E.C.R. I-10719. See also Miguel Poiares Maduro, 
'The Scope of European Remedies: The Case of Purely Internal Situations and Reverse 
Discrimination' in C Kilpatrick, T Novitz and P Skidmore (eds), The Future of Remedies in Europe 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford 2000), 124; Anthony Arnull, Derrick Wyatt and Alan Dashwood, 
Wyatt and Dashwood's European Union law (5th edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006) 761.  
84 Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] E.C.R. I-6279.  
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British authorities ordered her deportation, but the Court, on the grounds that 
Mr Carpenter conducted a business which provided services to advertisers 
established in other Member-States and occasionally travelled there for 
business purposes, found a link with Community law and went on to hold that 
the deportation of Ms Carpenter from Mr Carpenter’s country of origin, where 
they resided, would be detrimental to their family life and, therefore, to the 
conditions under which Mr Carpenter exercised a market freedom. This 
conclusion is problematic: after all, the choice was never between Mr Carpenter 
not exercising his freedom to provide services and maintaining the right to 
reside with his wife as opposed to exercising that freedom and, as a result of 
that, losing that right.85 The main problem with the concept of restriction used 
is that even though in this case a cross-border element could be found, such 
restriction was in no way related to the economic purpose of the freedom.  
 
This lack of relationship between economic aim and free movement is also 
present in the Court’s case-law on family reunification. In these cases the 
question was whether third-country nationals who were relatives of EU 
nationals who had exercised their free movement right to move into a host-
State should be allowed to join them directly from outside the Community in 
that Member-State, without previously having been lawfully resident in that or 
another Member-State.86 The argument against this was that the aim of the 
granting of family reunification rights was to enable Member-State nationals to 
move freely between Member-States. An impediment to that movement would 
only arise if the relatives of a EU national who previously resided lawfully with 
them in the territory of a Member-State would, as a result of the EU national’s 
movement to another Member-State, lose the right to reside with him; and this 
would only occur if the family members were already lawfully residing with the 
EU national before he moved to another Member-State.87 Accordingly:  
 
it is the family situation as it exists at the time the Community national 
decides to go to another Member-State which should be taken into 
account. [National immigration rules should not restrict the right of] a 
national who has already exercised his rights to free movement and 
                                            
85 Woods (n 73) 222-224; Alina Tryfonidou, 'Family Reunification Rights of (Migrant) Union 
Citizens: Towards a More Liberal Approach' (2009) 15 ELJ 634, 638. 
86This situation was effectively not addressed by either Council Directive 73/148/EEC on the 
abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the Community for nationals of 
Member States with regard to establishment and the provision of services or Directive 
2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States. 
87 This is what Tryfonidou calls the “moderate” approach. See (n 82) 637-638. 
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apparently has not been dissuaded from using that right for reasons related 
to the non-admission of third‑country‑national family members.88 
 
This was the rationale behind old cases such as Morson89 and more recent ones 
such as Akrich90. However, in Jia91 and particularly in Metock92 the Court chose 
to disregard this argument, holding that the relevant point was whether the 
third-country national was a family member of the EU national. Whether the 
refusal of the extension of the claimed family reunification rights would have 
impeded the exercise of the free movement right or not was deemed to be 
irrelevant.93  
 
Another line of cases where there appears to be no link between the cross-
border element and the economic telos of the Treaty provisions concerns 
changes in the State of residence by persons who continue to pursue their 
economic activities in their States of origin. This line of cases includes workers 
or self-employed persons who have moved their residence to another Member-
State but continue to pursue their economic activities in their home State94 or 
situations where a person controlling a number of undertakings in his home-
State moves into another State without any economic intent95. In these cases, 
even though the movement cannot be said to relate to access to the relevant 
markets in another Member-State, the Court still held that their situation fell 
within the scope of the market freedoms.96  
 
In all these cases, there is cross-border movement and the EU national is 
economically active, but there is no link between these two elements. It appears 
that the type of movement involved is not significant and even those who move 
                                            
88 Advocate General Geelhoed’s Opinion in Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] E.C.R. I-001, para. 70. 
89 Joined Cases 35 and 36/82 Morson and Jhanjan  [1982] E.C.R. 3723. 
90 Case C-109/01 Akrich  [2003] E.C.R. I-9607. 
91 Jia (n 88). 
92 Case C-127/08 Metock  ECR I-6241. 
93 Alina Tryfonidou, 'Jia or "Carpenter II": The Edge of Reason' (2007) 32 E.L.Rev. 908, 913-
915. 
94 Ritter-Coulais, Government of Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon, Case C-152/05 
Commission v Germany [2008] E.C.R. I-00039, Case C-527/06 Renneberg [2008] E.C.R. I-7735. 
Examples of traditional case-law can be found in Case C-112/91 Werner [1993] E.C.R. I-00429, 
Case C-293/03 Gregorio My  [2004] E.C.R. I-12013. 
95 Case C-470/04 N  [2006] E.C.R. I-7409, Case C-464/05 Geurts  [2007] E.C.R. I-9325. 
96 Alina Tryfonidou, 'In Search of the Aim of the EC Free Movement of Persons Provisions: 
Has the Court of Justice Missed the Point?' (2009) 46 CML Rev. 1591, 1596-1604. 
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back to their State of nationality and those who exercise merely temporary 
short-term movements to other Member-States without any economic purpose 
can rely on EU law for requiring Member-States (including their own Member-
State) to respect their rights.97 All these cases concern the free movement of 
persons, in particular of individuals. It is plausible, therefore, that normative 
considerations on the special status of individuals in the EU underlie this case-
law. The rationale behind this can perhaps be traced to the influence European 
Citizenship has had on the market freedoms: much of the case-law can be 
rationalised by reference to a preoccupation with creating a meaningful status 
for EU citizens, centred around the idea of fundamental rights, and in 
particular the fundamental right to a family life, rather than being connected to 
the internal market. This rationalisation is effectively anchored in a growing 
body of literature, which starting from the observation that a unitary approach 
to the free movement of persons appears to have been adopted in the Court’s 
language98, holds that the different Treaty provisions on the economic free 
movement of people are complementary to a more general freedom for the 
movement of natural and legal persons.99 This view argues that persons are not 
viewed merely as a source of labour by the EU, but as human beings; that the 
free movement of individuals has a social element which distinguishes it from 
the other market freedoms; and that the Treaty itself views the free movement 
of persons as more than a merely economic freedom.100 In effect, while the free 
movement of persons concerns economic actors, the free movement of goods 
has traditionally been read as not prohibiting obstacles to the free movement of 
traders but merely to the free movement of goods themselves. A similar 
argument can be made for capital.101 Hence, it is argued that the free movement 
of persons reflects fundamental rights and goes beyond the aim of creating and 
maintaining a common market, as opposed to the other freedoms which merely 
                                            
97 Christophe Schiltz, 'Akrich: A clear delimitation without limits' (2005) 12 MJ 241, 252. 
98 Hatzopoulos (n 38) 70. 
99Dieter H. Scheuing, 'Freizügigkeit als Unionsbürgerrecht' [2003] EuR 744, 753; Stephen 
Weatherill, 'Discrimination on grounds of nationality in sport' (1989) 9 YEL 55, 59; Snell (n 62) 
9; Patrick Dollat, Libre circulation des personnes et citoyenneté : enjeux et perspectives (Bruylant, 
Bruxelles, Belgique 1998) 26. Arguing that services should be treated differently from 
establishment and workers, as the former can be regulated by the home-State and requires a 
lesser degree of integration in the host-State, see Luigi Daniele, 'Non-discriminatory 
restrictions to the free movement of persons' (1997) 22 E.L.Rev. 191, 195-198. 
100 Arnull, Wyatt and Dashwood, 705-707; Jukka Snell, 'And Then There Were Two: Products 
and Citizens in Community Law' in T Tridimas (ed) European Law for th Twenty-First Century 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford 2004) 69-70. 
101 Alina Tryfonidou, 'Further steps on the road to convergence among the market freedoms' 
(2010) 35 E.L.Rev. 36, 38-39. 
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grant market or economic rights not deserving the same level of protection.102  
This has given rise to some Authors arguing that European Citizenship may 
normatively justify extending the scope of the free movement of persons 
beyond discrimination into a rule of reason103, or extending the scope of 
European law to purely internal situations, thereby eliminating reverse 
discrimination altogether and ensuring true equality between individuals 
through Union law104. It has also been argued that European Citizenship has 
had an impact on the case law on family reunification rights and even personal 
identity in what concerns names, with the Court reading the free movement 
provisions as protecting the human rights of any free moving EU citizen,105 and 
some go as far as to argue for a transposition of solidarity from the national to 
the European level106. 
 
If this is indeed the reason behind the developments in the case-law, it implies 
that the normative underpinning of the market freedoms ceases to be merely to 
protect the right to move for the purpose of taking up an economic activity, and 
that these freedoms now protect the rights of all economically active persons 
whose situation has a cross-border dimension. If so, the scope of the market 
freedoms may have moved on to cover the situations of all economically active 
Union citizens, provided that the situation involves a cross-border element and 
regardless of whether the restriction is related to the economic activity pursued.  
 
This would be a major development in EU law; but apart from the absence of a 
properly theorised analysis of the balancing of the relevant normative concerns 
at play, there is also no consideration of the very serious institutional 
implications of such a turn, a characteristic shared by most of the academic 
literature, which is much more concerned with analysing these cases from a 
purely “substantive” perspective. But alongside the development of minimally 
                                            
102 Chris Hilson, 'Discrimination in Community free movement law ' (1999) 24 European Law 
Review 445, 453; Peter Oliver and Stefan Enchelmaier, 'Free movement of goods: recent 
developments in the case law' (2007) 44 CML Rev. 649, 666. 
103 Spaventa (n 52) 143-148. 
104 Eleanor Spaventa, 'Seeing the wood despite the trees? On the scope of Union Citizenship 
and its constitutional effects' (2008) 45 CML Rev. 13, 36-39 for purely internal situation; 41 for 
indirect review. 
105 Ibid., 39-44. This can reflect the idea that the basic common values of European States lie in 
respect for human rights, which hence should be protected by the Court: see Advocate General 
Jacob’s Opinion in Case C-168/91 Konstantinidis [1993] E.C.R. I-1191; Peter Neussl, 'European 
Citizenship and Human Rights: An Interactive European Concept' (1997) 24 LIEI 47. 
106 Alexander Somek, 'Solidarity decomposed: being and time in European citizenship' (2007) 
32 E.L.Rev. 787, 789.  
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coherent normative underpinnings for the case-law, taking into account 
institutional considerations should be paramount. Carpenter exemplifies how 
decoupling the economic aim of the freedoms from their cross-border element 
leads to stretching the market freedoms to breaking point. As we have seen 
above, both the economic aim and the cross-border element are susceptible to 
being stretched: what an economic activity is can be contentious; what the 
relevant cross-border element is can be somewhat arbitrary. But the relaxation 
of the link between them has effectively lifted one of the major restrictions on 
the scope of the market freedoms. This expansionary effect on the market 
freedoms allows litigants to use the Court to challenge Member-States’ national 
measures which result from prima facie legitimate democratic processes. It 
means that the Court has decided to double-guess Member-States’ decisions in 
areas outside the traditional scope of EU law without any consideration as to 
why it would be better suited to pursue such an assessment to begin with. 
 
Normative claims defending this case-law on the basis of the development of 
European Citizenship and fundamental rights protection are, implicitly, calls 
for a greater role of courts and, eventually, the EU political process to the 
detriment of the Member-States’ political processes. As above, institutional 
questions are dressed up in “substantive” normative clothes. But the normative 
claims themselves – that European Citizenship allows for the expansion of the 
market freedoms and the protection of fundamental rights at EU level should 
prevail over the mechanisms of protection at national level – only make sense in 
the current institutional setting of the EU. Again, like Siamese twins, 
“substantive” normative claims contain institutional elements and institutional 
arguments reflect “substantive” normative goals.   
4. Between Normative Fluidity and Institutional Considerations 
 
All the methodological steps identified above – the cross-border element, the 
economic aim, and the relationship between them – have been subject to 
pressures due to mutations in their normative underpinnings. These mutations 
have gone hand-in-hand with evolutions in the European project, and 
particularly with non-economic developments, such as the appearance of 
concerns with reverse discrimination, the adoption and development of 
European Citizenship107 and the increasing importance of protecting 
                                            
107 Of which the recent decision in Zambrano (n 13) arguably makes the purely internal situation 
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Daniel Thym, 'Zambrano Case Opinion' (2011) 48 CML Rev. 1253, Peter Van Elsuwege, 
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fundamental rights. This might be further justified in light of the recent 
amendments to the TEU, which further extends the scope of the Union beyond 
the economic realm and emphasises the protection of human rights (Art. 2 
TEU), grants the Charter of Fundamental Rights the same legal value as the 
Treaties (Art. 6 TEU) and protects the equality of European citizens before the 
Union (Art. 9 TEU). But the developments in the case-law are also a result of 
how lightly theorised the normative assumptions underlying it were to begin 
with, thereby increasing the odds of the Court developing its case-law in a 
manner which goes beyond its initial underlying normative scope and 
continuously expanding the scope of the market freedoms as a result of 
pressures by self-interested litigants. This light theorisation enables new 
normative pressures to produce major effects, but also, and more importantly, 
to do so without any previous consideration of how old and new normative 
concerns should interact or to the consequences of the adoption of a given 
course.  
 
Of particular concern, in this regard, is the Court’s obliviousness to the 
institutional questions and consequences hidden beneath its case-law. In effect, 
one of the consequences of a measure falling within the scope of the market 
freedoms or European citizenship is that such a measure is now subject to 
review under EU law standards, including as to its adequacy under EU’s 
fundamental rights’ standards. As Advocate General Sharpston put it: 
 
According to the Court’s settled case-law, EU fundamental rights may be 
invoked when (but only when) the contested measure comes within the 
scope of application of EU law. All measures enacted by the institutions are 
therefore subject to scrutiny as to their compliance with EU fundamental 
rights. The same applies to acts of the Member States taken in the 
implementation of obligations under EU law or, more generally, that fall 
within the field of application of EU law. This aspect is obviously delicate, 
as it takes EU fundamental rights protection into the sphere of each 
Member State, where it coexists with the standards of fundamental rights 
protection enshrined in domestic law or in the ECHR.108 
 
To grasp the importance of appropriately delimiting the scope of the market 
freedoms, one need only think of the consequences of a person buying a book 
from another State via Amazon, or having enjoyed a holiday in another 
Member-State 15 years ago, or even watching a foreign television channel in his 
home State: could she/he claim a Union protection of her/his fundamental 
                                                                                                                                  
70 C.L.J. 309. This may lead to potentially similar developments for the market freedoms, as a 
result of systemic arguments put forth by litigants before the courts. 
108 Opinion in Zambrano (n 13) para. 156. 
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rights in a case similar to that of Mr Carpenter on the grounds that she/he was 
once part to an economic relationship with a cross-border element?109 At 
present, we are all potential recipients of services within the meaning of Article 
56 TFEU (ex-Art. 49 TEC); does it effectively suffice that someone had once 
benefited from a market freedom to forever benefit of all the rights which 
might arise from EU law, regardless of the existence of a relationship between 
that law and the situation at hand? If no limits were established, the EU’s 
protection of fundamental rights would no longer be incidental and subsidiary. 
National balancing of fundamental rights would be replaced by EU value-
choices whenever a situation fell within the EU’s limited scope of competences 
as a result of the primacy of EU law: the EU could end up monopolising the 
protection of fundamental rights in Europe. 
 
The consequences of this are mainly institutional, as the protection of human 
rights is a characteristic of all Member-States and there is already a European 
Court on Human Rights. Even from a substantive perspective, the results of 
this case-law are mainly the replacement of one fundamental rights’ balancing – 
that of the Member-State – for another – the CJEU’s. It is, in effect, a question 
of comparative institutional choice. Simultaneously, the Court may well expect 
to find itself before cases brought by agents trying to maximise the opening that 
the Court has granted them in Carpenter and related cases. Even if these 
developments had been merely kick-started by accident, as a result of work 
pressure or lack of communication between different chambers, path 
dependence and lock-in are still bound to kick in. And the lack of proper 
reasoning in the case-law and continuous under-theorisation of its normative 
underpinnings will make life easier for such agents, making the law ever more 
incoherent and normatively at drift. The Court would eventually likely be faced 
with a question it probably did not envision, and in all likelihood actively hopes 
to avoid110: does it have the conditions and the will to become the court of last 
resort for all measures adopted by any public body within the EU potentially 
affecting fundamental rights? Questions of capability, ability and legitimacy of 
the Court – all of them ultimately institutional questions – would finally have to 
come to the forefront of the discussion. 
 
                                            
109 A point already raised by R Lane and N Nic Shuibhne, ‘Angonese Case Note’ (2000) 37 CML 
Rev. 1237, 1242. 
110 As the Guimont (n 29) case law points out, the Court is aware of its limitations, actively 
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In short, it should be recognised that the Court’s case-law is a result of the 
interaction between different, and sometimes conflicting, normative goals – 
European integration, the removal of obstacles to free movement, the 
protection of areas of Member-State autonomy, the defence of fundamental 
rights - mediated through the existent institutional setting. Decisions about the 
scope of the free movement provisions of necessity imply assessments of 
comparative institutional choice – through direct effect, free movement rules 
re-allocate Member-State competences to the EU, and place areas which were 
under the exclusive remit of the EU’s political process under control by the 
courts. It is thereby crucial not only that greater attention be paid to the “pure” 
normative goals underlying the case-law, but also to the institutional questions 
of choice and ability which are always also present.  
5. Conclusion 
 
Legitimate concerns with the undesirable and unjust results of reverse 
discrimination, together with the justice of specific decision and the protection 
of fundamental rights provide normative grounds which, when taken together 
with considerations of strategic behaviour by the Court, and the influence of 
European Citizenship in construing the market freedoms, appear to lie behind 
much of the case-law analysed above. Nonetheless, institutional realities mean 
that this expansionary trend might gain traction independently of the original 
normative reasons which gave rise to its original development; if not checked, 
this may eventually lead to the Court being seen as a fundamental rights’ last 
body of appeal for all measures adopted within the EU-area, creating problems 
for the Court in its ability to deal with the concomitant workload and conflicts 
with other decision-making bodies. 
 
To address this, it must be recognized that the Court’s case-law is a result of 
the interaction between different, and sometimes conflicting, normative goals 
mediated through the existent institutional setting. Better reasoning and 
theorization of the relevant substantive normative underpinnings is 
undoubtedly in order; but this also requires that institutional considerations be 
recognised as normative concerns of equal importance for the Court of 
Justice’s decision-making process. In the end, the absence of consideration of 
institutional realities and implications does not eliminate them, as they are 
present in “pure” normative claims but also inform and are informed by them 
in a feedback loop reminiscent of a Mobius strip. It merely prevents a properly 
reasoned consideration of the relevant normative and institutional choices 
which the CJEU has to make in its case-law. 
 
 
